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Abstract
An investigation to re-evaluate the current use in military applications of the ADM-300 MultiFunctional Survey Instrument and its requirements are provided. This paper outlines a method to
upgrade the ADM-300 due to its eventual obsolescence using newly developed requirements that
meet the original justification for use in the USAF in 1992. The capabilities and features of
various detectors are analyzed and compared to the ADM-300. Response curves are generated
using Monte Carlo simulations. The detectors are prioritized based on their performance to
create metrics. A metanalysis of the metrics is conducted to limit bias within the process and
justify their application in various military scenarios. The Colibri platform is the recommended
replacement for the ADM-300 based on the method presented.
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1. Introduction
The ADM-300 Multi-Functional Survey has been in use for nine decades (Southern Scientific
Ltd., 2021) and, for the past three decades (Armstrong, Hoak, Nixon, & Martin, 1992) has been
used by the US Air Force (USAF). Due to advances in technology, the use of the ADM-300
should be re-evaluated. The ADM-300 is an electronic ionizing radiation detector. The base
unit of the ADM-300 is a Geiger-Muller (GM) gamma-ray detector, which has additional probes
for the detection of alpha, beta, and neutron radiation. The ADM-300 has undergone
incremental updates in an attempt to modernize. Newer platforms were investigated as
candidates to replace the ADM-300. Just as the ADM-300 replaced the AN/PDR-27 and
AN/PDR-43 using the ANSI N42.17A-1989, the newer platforms will be evaluated against the
updated standard. The requirements that justify using the ADM-300 are not simply the explicit
standards they are tested against but are implicit factors that increase efficiency and effectiveness
over previous generations. Investigating the origin of requirements aids in refining existing
needs. A process to evaluate newer platforms against developed requirements involves
comparing literature specifications, Monte Carlo simulations, effectiveness in various situations,
and hands-on testing. Some newer platforms considered are the Colibri, Radiagem 2000,
MULTIRAD-LLR, and RDS-100P platforms. The newer platforms are compared against the
ADM-300. Cost, training, and other logistical concerns will be discussed.

This document outlines a general-purpose rationale for re-evaluating a field tool used in
radiological emergency responses by the United States military. The criteria within can be
altered and adjusted based on the organization’s needs. All data contained is publicly available.
Much of the instrument specifications are available from technical manuals. Not all relevant
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information could be included in this document due to the interest of readability, brevity, and
access. A list of all sources is available in this document’s References section.
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2. Background
The ADM-300 replaced the AN/PDR-27 and AN/PDR-43 GM detector for use in service by the
USAF in 1991 (Armstrong, Hoak, Nixon, & Martin, 1992). In 1991, the USAF used the ANSI
N42.17A-1989, Performance Specifications for Health Physics Instrumentation-Portable
Instrumentation for Use in Normal Environmental Conditions (American National Standard
Performance Specifications for Health Physics Instrumentation - Portable Instrumentation for
Use in Normal Environmental Conditions, 1989) testing protocol and MIL-STD-810D,
Environmental Test Methods And Engineering Guidelines (MIL-STD-810D, Environmental Test
Methods and Engineering Guidelines, 1983) standard to ensure adequate testing of the ADM-300
against the AN/PDR-27 and AN/PDR-43. In much the same way, the other platforms will be
tested against the updated ANSI N42.17A-2003 (American National Standard Performance
Specifications for Health Physics Instrumentation-Portable Instrumentation for Use in Normal
Environmental Conditions, 2004) and MIL-STD-810H (MIL-STD-810H, Environmental
Engineering Considerations And Laboratory Tests, 2019), which supersede their previous
guidance. Currently, the USAF requires the following standards:


MIL-HDBK-454B: General Guidelines for Electronic Equipment



MIL-HDBK-781A: Reliability Test Methods, Plans, and Environments for Engineering
Development, Qualification, and Production



MIL-STD-130N: Identification Marking of U. S. Military Property



MIL-STD-461G: Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference
Characteristics of Subsystems and Equipment



MIL-STD-464C: Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems



MIL-STD-1472G: Human Engineering
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MIL-STD-1686C: Electrostatic Discharge Control Program for Protection of Electrical
and Electronic Parts, Assemblies and Equipment (Excluding Electrically Initiated
Explosive Devices)



MIL-STD-2169B: High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Environment

The ANSI N42.17A-2003 standard is more stringent and less ambiguous than ANSI N42.17A1989, and it cites NIST for the appropriate reference radiation source. The radiation testing
section of ANSI N42.17A-1989 is the focus of this paper since it is the most academically
rigorous, but considerations for integrated analysis, display, battery life, operating temperatures,
ruggedness, weight, etc. from the military standards are also considered.

These standards are also referred to as requirements. Meeting the requirements is sufficient for
certification but does not address the underlying assumptions for justifying the use of the ADM300, such as “off-the-shelf,” expanded capability, and the consolidation of two instruments.
Formalizing implicit needs into explicit requirements is required to compare their utility. Their
utility is derived from their ability to provide information to perform a risk analysis for radiation
emergencies.
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2.1. Exposure Risk
The scope of the comparison of the ADM-300 in this paper focuses on its ability to provide
information in radiation emergencies that are of concern to the military in the determination of
exposure risk. Exposure risk is the probability weighted with severity. Severity can be
characterized by the type of radiological incident, activity (quantity/intensity), duration, and
radiation type (alpha, beta, gamma, neutron) emitted.

2.2. Types of Radiological Incidents
Radiation emergencies fall into several categories and can be intentional or unintentional. The
type of radiological incident determines how exposure data can be collected. The performance
of a radiation detector in the following scenarios represents the benchmark capability of the
given detector. The scenarios below are considered representative radiation incidents of concern.


Nuclear Emergency: A nuclear emergency involving the detonation of a nuclear weapon
in a populated area. These are known as Domestic Nuclear Explosions (DNE). A type of
nuclear weapon is an improvised nuclear device (IND).



Nuclear Power Plant Accident: Major releases from a commercial nuclear power plant
are deviations from the periodic releases of airborne or waterborne radioactivity within
regulatory limits as part of normal operations. Spent nuclear fuel release is included in
this category. An accident or attack on a power plant could result in the spread of nuclear
material over a populated area.



Radiation Dispersal Device (RDD): An RDD, also known as a dirty bomb, is a mix of a
chemical explosive such as dynamite and radioactive powders or pellets such as the betaemitting isotope strontium-90. The detonation of the chemical explosive carries the
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radioactive material over an area. The radioactive material does not undergo nuclear
fission or fusion.


Alpha Radiation Dispersal Device (α-RDD), Broken Arrow, or Failed Improvised
Nuclear Device (IND): An α-RDD contains plutonium. Broken Arrow is the code name
of accidents involving a nuclear weapon outside the context of deterrence. Broken Arrow
may include IND, but for this scenario, RDD is considered. An IND that fails to reach
criticality is a failed IND. A failed IND behaves much like an RDD.



Transportation Accident: A transportation accident would fall into one of the categories
above. Shipments involving significant amounts of radioactive material must have
signage and documentation for the radioactive package.



Assistance to base “Environmental Health Units”: This scenario involves normal
radiation protection activities and tends to be more occupational.

The method section describes the above scenarios in more detail. The nonexperimental
validation of a detector is compared to its ability to outperform the ADM-300 in each
representative scenario.

The activity and radiation type affect the scale of the scenarios. Incidents have varying
durations, but it can be assumed large-scale incidents have long durations of exposure. Activity
and radiation type are intrinsically linked. An aliquot of a specific isotope always yields the
same activity and radiation type with all else constant. Radiation types determine the absorbed
dose, which can determine the effective dose if a person is exposed. Minimizing exposure
duration lessens the severity.
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Radiation sources of interest are radioisotopes or progeny with significant half-lives and a
relatively high specific activity. If the sum of half-lives of the isotope and progeny are less than
ten days (Definitions, 10 CFR § 71.4 , 2017), then the isotope stabilizes too quickly to affect a
target. Isotopes with low specific activity are dilute enough to be classified as 10 –4 A2/g for
solids and gases and 10–5 A2/g for liquids where A2 is defined by 49 CFR § 173.4352. Generally,
isotopes with high specific activity and long half-lives are easily transported and remain viable to
induce acute radiation exposure on a target.
These radiation sources have typically undergone refinement and not naturally occurring.
Natural background radiation, such as cosmic and terrestrial radiation, do not produce
radioactive material in sufficient concentrations to be weaponized. Gamma radiation detectors
will pick up background radiation and should be accounted for when searching for radiation
sources.

Radioisotopes of particular interest are industrial and medical sources where the specific activity
and half-lives can be significant.

Industrial and medical radiation sources have many legitimate

uses, but it important to understand when an individual source is out of place. “Some examples
include (i) nuclear well logging in the oil industry to determine if oil-producing rock formations
are present; (ii) sterilization of medical supplies and food; (iii) production of luminous watch
dials and signs; (iv) radiography of metal parts and welds in manufacturing and construction; (v)
thickness monitoring on production lines of sheet metals and foils; (vi) monitoring the structural
integrity of roads, buildings, and bridges; and (vii) the manufacture of smoke detectors.” 3.
Medical sources used in diagnostic imaging such as 99mTc, 131I and 201Tl initially have an intense
activity but relatively short half-lives. Likewise, brachytherapy sources may be removed instead
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of being allowed to decay away. In either case, it may seem radioactive material is being
transported but is rather the result of a medical procedure. Industrial and medical sources of
interest are 3H, 14C, 60Co, 82Br, 85Kr, 90Sr, 99Mo, 131I, 133Xe, 137Cs, 144Ce, 147Pm, 170Tm, 192Ir,
201

Tl, 241Am, 252Cf, 241Am, and 239Pu. For some of these isotopes, the progeny may be longer-

lived than the parent or emit a different type of radiation. Table 1 below classifies the type of
radiation emitted by each isotope. The table is not an exhaustive list of every possible
radionuclide but a representative sample of likely possibilities.

Table 1: Commonly Encountered Alpha, Beta, and Gamma Isotopes
Emitted Radiation
Type
Alpha
Beta
Gamma

Isotope
239

Pu, 241Am
3
H, 14C, 60Co, 82Br, 85Kr, 90Sr, 99Mo, 131I, 133Xe, 137Cs, 144Ce, 147Pm,
170
Tm, 192Ir, 201Tl
60
Co, 82Br, 85Kr, 99Mo, 131I, 133Xe, 137Cs, 144Ce, 147Pm, 170Tm, 192Ir,
201
Tl*, 239Pu*, 241Am*
*weakly emitting

When certain isotopes with an atomic number of 90 or greater such as 235U, 241Pu, and 252Cf, are
bombarded with thermal neutrons, they can undergo fissile reactions and emit neutrons. With
enough concentration or moderation, the process can be self-sustaining.

The type of radiation emitted determines the type of detector needed to identify or quantity the
activity. Alpha particles do not travel far and cannot penetrate the outer layer of human skin.
Beta radiation can travel a few feet in the air and are mainly an external hazard to the skin and
8

eyes. They are both an internal health concern if inhaled, ingested, or enter through a wound;
however, instruments designed to locate sources cannot measure an internal dose. Neutron and
photon radiations travel much farther in the air and can penetrate the skin. Because of this, they
can be a health risk at a distance from a radioactive source.

2.3. DoD Response
DoD organizations provide support during the nuclear and radiological scenarios described
above. Typically, this occurs when the relevant civil authorities have requested DoD assistance
because response operation requirements for federal, state, tribal, and local entities have been
expended or will exceed their capabilities. Support can be provided to deter, prevent, protect, or
recover from potential or actual incidents (DOE, 2010). If imminent harm to people, property, or
the environment is avoidable, the DoD can quickly respond to incidents until local authorities are
able to respond.

At times DoD responsibility to respond domestically may overlap with the Dept of Energy
(DoE), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
United States Coast Guard (USCG), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and Dept of Homeland Security (DHS). The coordinating
agency will primarily be the responsible authority. The DoD has varying levels of capabilities
and resources. An ideal radiation detector should be able to perform in as many situations as
possible.

2.4. Probability
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Probability is linked to the frequency of past events and indicators of vulnerabilities.
Preparedness is largely based on past events. Recent incidents contribute to an increased
likelihood of a future incident until the root cause is mitigated; therefore, recentness contributes
to an increase in probability. If an incident occurred more than once, then its contribution to the
increased probability is compounded. This stems from an indicator that has not been identified
or mitigated. Examples of indicators are negligence, lack of training or regulation, degraded
hardware, and other deficiencies. Each of the past events falls into a scenario discussed.

Individual disasters, incidents, and sites:


2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster

The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was the most recent nuclear and most severe nuclear
accident since the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown. A tsunami struck the nuclear power plant and
disabled the cooling to the reactors resulting in the meltdown of 3 reactors. The meltdown
initiated multiple hydrogen explosions, released radioactive contamination in the air and water.
Radioactive cesium-137 from the incident is still detectable in the ocean today.



2001 Instituto Oncologico Nacional radiotherapy accident

The Instituto Oncologico Nacional (National Oncological Institute) in Panama City, Panama,
overexposed patients to lethal doses of radiation from a linear accelerator. The shielding blocks
used to protect patients were improperly calculated when entered into the treatment planning
system. The treatment planning system assumed more shielding and calculated an exposure time
to compensate. The longer exposure time resulted in a much larger dose. Twenty-eight patients
suffering from prostate and cervix cancer received lethal doses due to improper calculations and
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data entry. The newly calculated dose was not verified using a water phantom or any other
testing procedure before human use. The accidental exposure was determined to be due to
negligence, and as of this time, the oncology staff is being sued (International Atomic Energy
Agency, 2001).



1987 Goiânia accident

A radiotherapy source was stolen from an abandoned hospital in Goiânia, Brazil. The 93 grams
of 137Cs source was removed from its shielded enclosure and subsequently handled and divided
to over 249 people and contaminated approximately 112k people. The total activity at the time
was estimated to be 51 TBq. The thief experienced prodromal radiation sickness upon taking the
source home. Not knowing the cause of his illness, the thief continued to explore and share the
source due to its deep blue color. Friends and family were given pieces of the source. Five
individuals suffered acute radiation poisoning and died (International Atomic Energy Agency,
1988).



1986 Chernobyl disaster

The most famous and most severe nuclear disaster was the meltdown of the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant in current day Pryp’yat’, Ukraine. An exercise at the plant to test the delay between
electric and backup power to the cooling system initiated a sequence of events that caused the
reactor to overheat. The superheated water ignited and caused a catastrophic explosion. A 16kilometer radius was contaminated with radioactive material, and an exclusion zone of 30
kilometers was later set (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1992).
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1959 SRE partial nuclear meltdown at Santa Susana Field Laboratory

The sodium reactor experiment (SRE) at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory, CA, experienced a
partial meltdown for two months. The SRE was the first of its kind, with many procedures based
on theoretical limits and cladding materials with little operational experience. The reactor’s
primary coolant was liquid sodium, but tetralin contaminated the coolant, causing sodium to be
trapped in the fuel rod. 13 of the 43 fuel rods overheated and melted (Ashley, et al., 1961). The
release of radioactivity occurred gradually and within regulatory limits. The SRE was
decommissioned in 1964 (Carroll, Conners, Harris, Marzec, & Ureda, 1983).



1958 Mailuu-Suu tailings dam failure

The dam holding back 600k cubic meters of uranium tailings failed due to neglect and erosion in
Mailuu-Suu, Kyrgyzstan. Uranium tailings were a byproduct of uranium mining left behind. No
attempt was made to seal or stabilize the material after uranium mining was abandoned. The
uranium tailings flowed into the Mailuu-Suu River and spread 40 kilometers into Uzbekistan
(Birsen & Kadyrzhanov, 2012).



1957 Kyshtym disaster

The Kyshtym disaster was an accidental explosion of ammonium nitrate at a plutonium
production plant for nuclear weapons in Ozyorsk, Russia. The explosion dispersed uranium and
plutonium over an area of 20k sq kilometers. Within a few days, 300 of the 5000 residents of
Ozyorsk died of radiation poisoning. Many details are unknown due to censorship (Webb,
2015).
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1957 Windscale fire

The Windscale fire was a fire of a cartridge of a graphite-moderated reactor at the Windscale
nuclear power plant in Seascale, Great Britain. The fire released radioactive isotopes in the
atmosphere of Iodine-131, Cesium-137, Xenon-133, Xenon-135, and Strontium-90 over the UK
and the rest of Europe. The long-term health effects are unknown mainly due to censorship but
are suspected of being responsible for 240 deaths related to cancer and affected 500 square
kilometers of the countryside (Highfield, 2007).



1954 Totskoye nuclear exercise

The Totskoye nuclear exercise was a Russian military exercise involving a 40-kiloton atomic
bomb detonation. The bomb was detonated at the Totskoye range, 15 kilometers from the rural
town of Totskoye in Russia. 45k Soviet military members were ordered to collect data from the
fallout of the epicenter but not to exceed 1 R/h on their detectors. Training and safety
procedures, PPE, and decontamination procedures were not followed strictly (Markov, 2012).



1950 Desert Rock exercises

The Desert Rock exercises were a series of 8 military exercising involving several nuclear bomb
detonations. Nuclear device yields ranged from zero to 44 kilotons. The tests were conducted
over seven years at the Nevada Proving Grounds. 20k – 68k DoD personnel witnessed these
events from 11 kilometers away, excluding airdrop personnel. Personnel were trained in
radiation safety procedures, wore dosimeters, used PPE, decontaminated after leaving controlled
areas. Average exposure was normally distributed around 0.1-0.4 rem, with the highest exposure
of 22 rem for airdrop personnel. Additionally, psychological tests were performed for
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approximately 11k DoD members for their reaction to witnessing a nuclear detonation (Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, 2015).

2.5. ADM-300 Consolidation
The risks determine the constraints for preparedness. From a military perspective, radiation
assessment teams should be equipped with detectors to handle each scenario. The USAF, until
1992, used four different detectors to detect three types of radiation, but this drove the need for a
quality multifunction portable RADIAC instrument. In table 2 are the four instruments the
USAF used, and the device that replaced them was the ADM-300.

Table 2: Various Radiation Instruments and their Operational Capabilities
(Heflebower, Le Gallo, Lawrence, & Cline, 2005)

In the greater context of a radiation detection suite in table 3, the ADM-300 provides an in-situ
dose measurement for an alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron radiation at close distances; however,
it cannot identify unknown isotopes. The ADM-300 effectively reduces the required number of
detectors of a radiation detection suite.
14

Table 3: Radiation Equipment for Occupational and Environmental Health
Item
RADēCO Grab Sampler
ADM-300

Sample Type
Alpha, Beta
Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Xray

Electronic Personnel Dosimeter (EPD)

Gamma

GR 135 Radioisotope Identifier
SAM 940 Radiation Isotope Identifier
Victoreen 451P
Electronic Personnel Dosimeter (EPD)
N2

Gamma
Gamma
Gamma
Neutron

Target
Collect particles
Radiation
Personal Radiation
Dose
Isotope identification
Isotope identification
Radiation
Personal Radiation
Dose

2.6. ADM-300 Shortfalls
During validation and testing, the ADM-300 did not meet the criteria of ANSI N42.17A-1989 in
a few areas. The findings are summarized below:


The alarm activation delay exceeds ten mrem for fields greater than 1.3 R/hr.
Furthermore, the display lags behind the audio alarm. This delay is due to a built-in time
lag to update the display every 2 seconds. Assuming the alarm activation delay is fixed
between each successive delivered radiation exposure, an exposure rate greater than 1.3
R/hr will result in exposure to the individual of more than ten mrem (Armstrong, Hoak,
Nixon, & Martin, 1992).



The angular dependence of the ADM-300 is dependent upon the orientation of the
electronics in the package through which the radiation must travel to get to the detector.
Because the detector is mounted in the unit, it did not pass the angular dependence
requirements of ANSI N42.17A for all axes of rotation. The ADM-300 unit with the beta
window on the bottom has less angular dependence than the unit with the beta window
along the side (Armstrong, Hoak, Nixon, & Martin, 1992).
15



Since the instrument is a digital instrument, the response time should be instantaneous.
The manufacturer’s literature indicates the response time is 2 seconds in a field above 1
R/hr and below 5 seconds in a field less than 1 R/hr. The ADM-300 updates the display
approximately every 2 seconds, regardless of the radiation field that is being measured
(Armstrong, Hoak, Nixon, & Martin, 1992).



The GM-tubes under responds from 1 µR/hr to 2000 R/hr. by 5% and over responds
above 8000 R/hr. by 27%.



The GM-tubes under responds at 140 keV and over responds at 120 keV.

Due to its age, the ADM-300 is no longer supported by its last manufacturer and has reached
end-of-life. Therefore, when parts fail, they cannot be replaced or repaired by the manufacturer,
and readings taken by the detector may potentially be inaccurate and may not stand up to legal
scrutiny.

2.7. Past Needs Assessment
The next generation detector’s needs should build upon the needs of the original detector so that
the performance of the ADM-300 is the minimum standard. This also provides an opportunity to
re-evaluate the original needs to see if they still meet today’s needs. The original needs of the
ADM-300 in summary are:


The detector is “off-the-shelf.” “Off-the-shelf” in this context means the product is
already commercially available and was not custom-designed for the client. Off-the-shelf
components cater to many clients enabling economies of scale, which defers the cost of
operations and maintenance. The implicit benefits are the devices can be made available
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to multiple readiness teams worldwide, the devices tend to have fewer proprietary parts,
and are more easily repaired.


The ability to detect alpha, beta, high and low range gamma, and neutron radiation.
Essentially, the ADM-300 detects the four major radiation particles.



Consolidation of multiple instruments. The ADM-300 consolidated the functions of four
different detectors. A successor should ideally reduce the number of detectors as part of
a deployment package to perform a full-spectrum analysis. At the very least, the detector
should encompass the features of the ADM-300 and four detectors it replaced.



The ADM-300 went through the appropriate certifications in 1992: ANSI N42.17A-1989
and MIL-STD-810D. Since then, the standards have been updated and appended, as
stated in section 2. Each candidate must be tested using the new standards. The
requirements are listed in ANSI N42.17A-2003 and are summarized as follows:


The ratio of the mean indicated value to the conventionally true value shall fall within
the range 0.90 to 1.10.



For probes, the surface sensitivity shall be expressed in counts per unit time or
activity per unit squared. Activity is quoted in Curie, Becquerel, and/or dpm.



Quote 2π activities (surface emission rates) for alpha and beta sources and 4π
(absolute activities) for an alpha, beta, and gamma sources.



Consider the backscatter and self-absorption effects of the source and surface to be
monitored when the efficiency is determined using a source’s 4π emission rate.



Calculate activity-based alarm set points by dividing the efficiency by 2.



The photon energy range must be at least between 80 keV and 1.25 MeV and within
20% of the reference energy.
17



The beta energy range must be at least between 0.2 MeV to 3.5 MeV and within 50%
of the reference energy.



The neutron energy range must be stated and within -50% and +100% of the
reference energy.



The mean response of an instrument to a photon radiation incident at any angle not
exceeding 45º from the direction of maximum response of the instrument shall be not
less than 80% of this maximum response. At an angle of 90º from the direction of
maximum response, the mean instrument reading shall be not less than 50% of the
maximum response. These requirements apply for at least two representative photon
energies.

MIL-STD-810H provides a good source of a variety of environmental conditions a typical
detector should be able to function. In the MIL-STD’s, the assumptions of any device ought to
perform are explicitly written as compliance items to prevent the use of shoddy instruments
obtained from poorly written contracts. In the case where MIL-STD’s are overly esoteric, then
the need for off-the-shelf should take priority. For example, the performance of a detector in the
presence of weapon fire is not typically a concern of a commercially available detector. Off-theshelf in-situ detectors are typically designed to work in a wide range of climates and are designed
to handle the expected roughness during transport and operation. The design of commercially
available off-the-shelf detectors surpasses the minimum standards set in the MIL-STD’s in many
respects. However, adherence to MIL-STD’s cannot be guaranteed with off-the-shelf devices.
The needs of the military benefit with an overlap of the needs of emergency responders
nationwide. Emergency responders utilize an All-Hazards Approach, in which detection
equipment can be exposed to the same variety of extreme environments. Therefore, equipment
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designed primarily for emergency responders will simultaneously meet most of the needs of the
military.

2.8. Current Needs Assessment
A successor to the ADM-300 needs to leverage technology to remain relevant. Computers are
easily accessible and portable. Recording and recording data should not be a manual process.
The ADM-300 displays readings on an LCD screen for the last measurement performed. The
memory is cleared with each measurement. A serial cable can be connected to the ADM-300,
providing a string of data per 2 seconds containing dose rate, accumulated dose, unfiltered dose,
mode, alarm, and audio chirp (Hansen, 2010). Fig 1 shows an example of a typical setup:

Fig. 1: ADM-300 Serial Interface with a Laptop and GPS Unit
(Hansen, 2010)
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Fig. 1 demonstrates a need for a less cumbersome method of analyzing data in-situ and
illustrates a basic minimum data analysis method. Therefore, a need is wireless data
communication to a computer, regardless if the detector has built-in software that analyzes the
data. The assumption is that the data transmitted is open-source or in a nonproprietary format.
Once the manufacturer no longer supports the device, the software can be supported selfsufficiently. Data aggregation is a powerful tool in developing a site picture. The aggregation of
data from multiple devices can be done over a network. The job of a health physicist can be
parallelized if multiple detectors are deployed and are collecting data simultaneously to a server.
The need can be stratified into minimum and recommended requirements in fig. 2 below.
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Fig. 2: Minimum and Recommended Requirements Venn Diagram

Lastly, the general characteristics of any good detector are desired. These fall into six main
categories: absoluteness, precision and accuracy, dose range, dose-rate range, stability, and
energy dependence (Attix, 1986).
The absoluteness of a detector is its ability to be used as a primary measurement device, thus not
requiring calibration. Most detectors are secondary measurement devices requiring calibration
with a standard or a primary measurement device. The advantage of absoluteness is the detector
does not require constant calibration with another item eliminating the multiplicity of materials
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and tasks. Absoluteness is independent of precision and accuracy, but an absolute detector must
be reasonably accurate and precise.
Precision is the detector’s ability to handle random errors due to ambient conditions. The
standard deviation is inversely proportional to precision. Accuracy is the proximity of the
expected value to the actual value of the quantity measured. Although accuracy is independent
of precision, both reasonable accuracy and precision are required for a viable detector.
The dose range must be sensitive throughout the entire range to be measured. The response can
be linear, but if it is non-linear, the dose-response curve must have a known function. Ideally,
the lower limit of the range should be zero, which should account for instrumental background
noise. The dose range at a minimum should be able to detect natural background radiation,
which is on average about 0.3 mrem in the US (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2020), and
double background with reproducibility and minimal time delay. When the detector reaches or
exceeds the range’s upper limit, the reading should not revert to zero. For GM detectors,
deadtime can contribute to a zero reading. This is poor design and places the user in danger.
Internal circuitry should interpolate readings during deadtime. Internal circuitry should at
minimum interpolate readings during deadtime.
The response time constant should be short for an ideal dose rate response. The response time
constant is defined as when it takes the reading to reach 1/e of its steady-state for the constant
field. As mentioned previously, the reading during deadtime should not be zero.
The stability of a detector is related to its ability to be able to detect consistently over the life of
the device. Use, temperature, atmospheric conditions, humidity, etc. should not cause a change
in the dose sensitivity before irradiation. After each irradiation, the detector should be able to
read consistently. A measure of stability is fading.
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The energy dependence of a detector is the dependence of its reading per unit quantum or kinetic
energy of the radiation. As the energy of the radiation changes, the reading of the detector may
have an independent or dependent response.
These characteristics as well as configuration, calibration type, and reusability, are detailed in the
methods section.
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3. Methodology
The methodology section consists of selecting the combined instrumentation needs and selecting
prospective instruments. An explanation of the requirements and scenarios is below. Each
instrumentation platform is briefly described, evaluated on the requirements and scenarios. The
scenarios are used to calibrate the weighting in the comparison of detectors. The weightings
scale the importance of each requirement, but a function can be used instead. The ADM-300 is
evaluated first as a baseline reference and subsequently the candidate detectors. The ADM-300
is used as a reference to compare candidates for its replacement. The detectors that score well in
this section are evaluated experimentally in the next section.

3.1. Combined Instrument Needs
The methods of detection are limited to in situ, real-time and portable instruments. Specifically,
localized handheld exposure rate survey instruments are included in this study. Ion chambers,
GM tubes, scintillators, semiconductors, or other types of detectors are considered. Every
radiation type that may affect tissue is considered, such as alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron
radiation. Detection equipment can be used to perform contamination surveys of people,
property, or the environment (ground deposition), but stationary detectors such as portal
detectors are not considered, whereas handheld detectors that can operate in a portal
configuration are considered. Isotropic identification, such as gamma spectroscopy, while
important, is not the focus of the study. Large-scale monitoring via airborne or vehicle-borne
surveys is not the focus of this study. Air sampling, passive sampling, or laboratory analysis of
exposures is not included in this study.
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3.2. Prospective Instruments
The detectors chosen for evaluation can fulfill a similar role as the ADM-300. The detectors
below are not inclusive of all instruments in this category but serve an example of a process to
determine a successor. Any detector may be compared, but detectors that fit the scope of this
study can effectively provide data to make an accurate field assessment will likely score better.
The detectors considered were the Colibri, Radiagem 2000, MULTIRAD-LLR, and RDS-100P
platforms.

3.3. Requirements
Each need can be viewed as a requirement. The requirements can be considered to be meeting a
minimum value or simply as a feature or a relative ranking of detectors for the requirement. The
requirements are arranged into four tables: Instrument Limits and Specifications, Intrinsic
Characteristics, Smart Features, and Logistical.

Each table is scored in its respective section with an assigned utility. Utilities can be arbitrary
since they will be scaled appropriately after weighting. For all cases, a higher utility is more
desirable. The scores are combined into a matrix and compared. Features that are present or
absent will be represented with a 0 or 1, with 1 indicating a desirable feature is available. If a
numerical value already exists for a specification, then it will be used instead of a ranking
system. For example, a battery life of 5 hours will be represented as 5 to preserve the relative
proportions between detectors. Given a battery life of 5 hours and 100 hours, a ranking system
would not preserve the 20x effect of 100-hour battery life over 5-hour battery life. An item’s
weight will have an inverse utility of 1/x since a heavier detector is less desirable. For example, a
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2-kg object will have a utility of 1/2. For intangible requirements such as user interface ease of
use, a ranking system from 1 to 10 will be utilized. The ADM-300 serves as the baseline of the
ranking system, and its value will be five, which allows the other five candidates to be higher or
lower in rank to the ADM-300, but detectors may have the same rank if they are equivalent.
Probes in a platform are scored, averaged, and added to the parent device’s utility if a
requirement does not explicitly apply to the probe. Note that attributes are normalized to one
prior to applying weights.

3.4. Instrument Limits and Specifications
Alarm – An audio and/or visual alarm signifies an exceedance of a predetermined exposure until
reset. Alarms may vary in sound or appearance to signify different information, such as the
exceedance of an exposure rate versus the total dose. Alarms should also indicate the failure of
any core components. Alarms vary in complexity, from monotone beeps or flashes to descriptive
text. The utility assigned is a Boolean: either it has an alarm or not.

Battery indicator – The battery indicator may be a gauge, dial, or an alarm when low. The
utility assigned is a Boolean.

Battery life – Battery life is the operating time of the detector measured in hours. The total life
or number of recharges of a rechargeable battery is not considered. The utility assigned is 1 per
hour of continuous operation without recharge or replacement.
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Dimensions – the height, length, and width of the instrument enclosure are given in centimeters.
A smaller device lends to a more portable and easier-to-carry device. The utility assigned is the
inverse of the volume: 1/V. The lengths of cords, straps, and cables are not considered.

Humidity – The ability of the detector to operate in humid conditions is measured in percent
humidity. The utility assigned is the absolute value of the range. For example, a detector that
can operate between 0-95% humidity is assigned a score of 95.

Interference – Detectors may experience fluctuations in readings due to external electromagnetic
fields, which include nonionizing radiation from radio, microwave, and cellular. The criteria
used to determine electromagnetic interference limits are outlined in ANSI N42.17A-2003 or
MIL-STD-810. A device is then given a pass or fail; therefore, the utility assigned is a Boolean.

Interference – Detectors that excel in the detection of ionizing radiation of a single particle type
may exhibit sensitivities when exposed to another. For example, a dedicated alpha detector may
be sensitive to beta radiation. The criteria used to determine the limits of ionizing radiation
interference are outlined in ANSI N42.17A-2003 or MIL-STD-810. The device is then given a
pass or fail; therefore, the utility assigned is a Boolean.

Ingress Protection - Ingress protection ratings refer to the level of protection of an electrical
enclosure from solids and liquids. IP ratings are governed by International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) standard 60529 and are optional certification. The first digit following IP
indicates the level of protection against solids. The second digit indicates the level of protection

27

against the instrusion of water. For enclosed devices, the relevant digit is the second since
watertight objects tend to be protected against dust. The utility assigned is the second digit of the
IP rating; for example, a rating of IP68 or IPX8 is assigned a utility of 8.

Mechanical: shock and vibration – Detectors may experience fluctuations in readings due to
vibration or other sudden changes in acceleration. Due to the handheld nature of the devices,
mechanical shock and vibration are inevitable. The criteria used to determine the limits of
mechanical shock and vibration are outlined in ANSI N42.17A-2003 or MIL-STD-810. The
device is then given a pass or fail; therefore, the utility assigned is a Boolean.

Power – This requirement indicates the type of power used by the detector, such as AA batteries
or 220 A/C. The utility assigned for detectors that do not have a portable power source is 0.
Non-replaceable rechargeable batteries are assigned a utility of 1. Proprietary replaceable
batteries are given a utility of 2. Replaceable nonproprietary batteries are given a utility of 3.

Power-on self-test (POST) – The power-on self-test is routine conducted by the device when
turned on that ensures embedded systems are operating. A failure of any core component will
prompt an alarm. The utility assigned is a Boolean.

Pressure – The detector’s ability to handle rapid compression and decompression and lowpressure extremes are tested. Pressure greater than sea level is not tested, but pressure up to
12192 meters is tested. The testing protocols are listed in ANSI N42.17A-2003 or MIL-STD-
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810. Deviation in readings by more than 15% result in a failure. The device is then given a pass
or fail, therefore the utility assigned is a Boolean.

Readout – The readout is simply the presence of a real-time feedback mechanism in response to
ionizing radiation. For example, a thermoluminescent device, does not have a readout and
requires submission to a lab for dose calculation, whereas an ADM-300 has an LCD screen that
can display in real-time the measured dose. The utility assigned is a Boolean.

Temperature: range – The operating temperature limits are given. The operating minimum and
maximum temperature limits given are between is -30 C and 50 C. Temperatures outside this
range are not tested even in storage conditions. The utility assigned is the absolute value of the
range. For example, detector that can operate between -5 C and 35 C is assigned a score of 40.

Temperature: shock – The detector’s ability to handle rapid temperature rise and decline are
tested. The temperature did not exceed the temperature range above. The testing protocols are
listed in ANSI N42.17A-2003 or MIL-STD-810. Deviation in readings by more than 15% result
in a failure. The device is then given a pass or fail, therefore the utility assigned is a Boolean.

Units (SI, CGS, MKS) – The centimeter-gram-second (CGS) meter-kilogram-second (MKS)
systems predate the International System (SI), or metric systems of radiation units. The CGS
and MKS systems use units such as curie, rad, and rem. SI units are based on the fundamental
units of second, meter, kilogram, ampere, kelvin, mole, and candela. The SI system uses units
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such as becquerel, gray, and sievert. SI is the standard and preferred system and is scored with a
value of 1, and all other systems are assigned zero.

Weight – The weight of the detector is measured in kilograms. Much like volume, a lighter
device lends to a more portable and easier-to-carry device. The utility assigned is the inverse of
the mass: 1/M. The weights of accessories not dependent on the direct operation of the device
are not included, such as straps, cases, and covers. The weight of cables that connect probes are
included in the weight of the probe.

3.5. Intrinsic Characteristics
Accuracy – Accuracy is the mean accuracy of the measured values over the calibration known
values. If the closer the ratio is to 1, then the reading is more accurate. An accuracy of 1 is
given a utility of 10. Every 1% away from unity decreases the utility by 1. Accuracy of more
than 10% off is assigned zero since the device no longer adheres to ANSI 42.17A section 7.1.
For example, an accuracy of 1.055 or 0.955 is given a utility of 5.5.

Efficiency (4π): Efficiency is reported for the 4π geometry. Efficiency is a percentage from 0100%. The assigned utility is the percent from 0-100.

Energy Response: alpha, beta, gamma, neutron – Energy response, also known as energy
dependence, is the magnitude of the detector response relative to constant radiation energy.
Generally, the stated response is the peak of an energy response curve, but some detectors
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publish the entire energy response range. The utility assigned is the difference of the log range
stated.

Energy Resolution – The measure of how precisely the detector can distinguish two adjacent
energies of radiation. The utility assigned is an inverse relationship of one over the stated
percentage (1/%). This does not apply to Geiger-Mueller detectors.

Dose Rate Range: alpha, beta, gamma, neutron - The dose rate range is the maximum detectable
reading minus the lowest detectable reading. The utility assigned to the dose range is calculated
as the log(max)- log(min).

Response Time – Response time is measure in seconds for the detector to reach a stable reading
within 90% of the ambient radiation field. Response time takes into account the RC time
constant and the refresh rate of the internal electronics. The mode is assumed to be set to fast for
detectors that offer fast, medium, and slow modes. A faster response time is desired, so the
utility assigned is the inverse of the time elapsed: 1/T.

Sensitivity - Sensitivity is a measure of how efficiently radiation is converted into a useable
signal or counts. Emission rates are typically reported in terms of _/sec or _/sec. Activity is
quoted in Curie, Becquerel, or dpm. Sensitivity may refer to minimum detectable activity
(MDA) or lower limit of detection (LLD), but not sensitivity from cross-interference. The utility
assigned is an inverse utility of 1/B, since a lower sensitivity is preferable, where B is measured
in becquerel.
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Start-up Time – Start-up time is the time from which the device, from a period of rest, is initially
turned on to the time a measurement can be taken. The stability or accuracy of the measurement
is not a factor, as this is taken into account for response time. A faster start-up time is desired, so
the utility assigned is the inverse of the time elapsed: 1/T.

3.6. Smart Features
Connectivity: Bluetooth, Cellular, Print, RF/Other, Satellite, WIFI, Wired – The presence of a
connectivity feature is assigned a utility of 1. If the feature can support telemetry, then it is given
a utility of 2.

Data Analysis: conversion, dose-limits, error, integrate, isotope ID, expert/advanced mode – The
presence of a data analysis feature is assigned a utility of 1.

GPS – The device can append measurement data with coordinates in real-time. It can connect to
or includes a GPS or another sensor capable of providing accurate coordinates. The presence or
absence of this feature is assigned a Boolean.

Graphical User Interface – The graphical user interface of the software is subjective. An
intuitive layout and input schema are preferred. A scale of 0 to 5 is used, with 0 indicating no
graphical user interface and 5 indicating the best experience.
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Internal Clock: date & time – The device must have the ability to append measurement data with
a timestamp. The presence or absence of this feature is assigned a Boolean.

Internal Memory – The presence of available memory capacity of the device to store
measurement data. Data is typically measured in bytes. The presence of internal memory
indicates the ability to store readings in some meaningful way, and the exact amount of memory
is generally not a concern. If data output is significant, the ability to use removable memory
would be necessary. The presence or absence of this feature is assigned a Boolean.

Removable Flash Memory – The presence of a port to insert nonproprietary flash memory to
back up or record measurements is assigned a utility of 1. If the device lacks a port for flash
memory, it is given a 0.

Screen: Black/Color/none – This attribute is assigned a utility of 0 if there is no real-time visual
indicator of elevated exposure. Film badge dosimeters lack a real-time or visual indicator of
elevated exposure. If the detector has an analog dial or a monochrome LCD screen, it is
assigned a utility of 1. The presence of a color screen consists of an array of individually
addressable color pixels by the detector’s software to display various information. The utility of
a color screen is assigned a 2.

3.7. Logistical
Calibration – The minimum periodicity of calibration within a year traceable to a national
laboratory standard, including the initial calibration. The number of calibrations is at least 1. A
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device requiring weekly calibration is 52. The utility of calibrations is given an inverse of 1/x.
This assumes the detector is used once per week.

Consolidation Factor – The number of the types of radiation that are detected by a single device
or the number of devices made obsolete by the device.

Consumables Required – The device requires consumables to operate. This includes check
sources, batteries, gases, filters, etc. The utility assigned is an inverse utility since requiring
consumables is not preferred. If one or no consumables are needed, then the utility is given a 1.

Decontamination Method – If the device can be decontaminated with water without the
replacement of any significant parts, then it is assigned a utility of 1. If water decontamination is
not possible, it is given zero utility.

Durability – The criteria for durability are measured on a pass/fail. The device undergoes a
stress test for vibrations, temperature, altitude, humidity, etc., and if any failure occurs, it is
assigned a utility of zero; otherwise, it is 1.

Ease of Use – Ease of use is subjective. Ease of use is measured on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5
indicating the preferred experience.

End of Life – The projected end-of-life of a product is the date the manufacturer no longer
supports the repair or replacement of the device. The utility assigned is the year of the projected
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end-of-life product minus the current year. If the device has already reached end-of-life, then the
utility assigned is zero.

Initial Cost – The initial cost is the purchase price of the device for initial use. The quote for one
detector with a connected alpha probe was used as a representative cost. A purchase order of one
resolves the issue of the variable pricing of bulk orders. Adding the price of a probe normalizes
the base unit’s cost and considers the need for additional probes. The utility assigned is an
inverse utility of 1/$.

Maintenance Cost – The maintenance cost is the cost incurred to keep the device working in
good condition per year, including the price to calibrate the instrument, clean, or service. The
maintenance cost should conservatively be 3% of the asset value. The utility assigned is an
inverse utility of 1/$.

Serviceability – Serviceability is the device’s ability to be maintained or repaired by the user. If
the device is user-serviceable, then the utility assigned is one; otherwise, it is zero.

Shelf Life – Shelf life is measure in days the detector can remain in good working order before
expiring or needing to be replaced. The utility assigned is measured in years from 1 to 5.

Tamper Resistance – The device’s ability to hinder or detect an effect to induce a false positive
or negative reading. Tamper resistance instills confidence in measurement integrity. Tamper
resistance includes features such as tamper seals or more robust features. The end-user should
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detect if the instrument were tampered with during normal use. The utility is the number of
tamper-resistant features implemented on a device.

Training Cost – Training cost is the cost to educate the users on how to operate the device. The
cost is averaged per user for the first year. The utility assigned is an inverse utility of 1/$. This
figure does not include the hourly rate of the user. The training cost is often constant for devices
from the same manufacturer.

Training Time - Training time is the time needed to educate the users on how to operate the
device. The time is measured in hours per user for the first year. The utility assigned is an
inverse utility of 1/h. The training time is often constant for devices from the same manufacturer.

Transportability – Transportability in this context is defined by the device’s ability to be carried
by either hand, non-motorized vehicle, or motorized vehicle. A utility of 3 is assigned for
handheld devices, 2 for requiring a non-motorized vehicle, and 1 for requiring a motorized
vehicle.

3.8. Scenarios
The representative scenarios listed previously provide a way to weigh the requirements based on
the detector performance. After compiling all the utility values from the different detector types,
each detector is placed in the following scenarios. The degree of capability of each detector is
compared against each scenario’s needs. After ranking each detector, the weights are adjusted to
match. The details of each scenario are as follows:
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3.8.1. Domestic Nuclear Explosions (DNE)
The first type is a domestic nuclear explosion (DNE), which involved the detonation of a nuclear
weapon in a populated area. Even a small yield atomic detonation is the worst-case scenario due
to the extreme release of energy in a short time. In a nuclear explosion, mass is converted to
energy in an instant. Approximately less than half of the energy creates the blast itself, and less
than that is converted to heat, and the rest is ionizing radiation. Anything within 1.5 miles of the
center of the explosion is disintegrated. The objects within this radius, including the earth, are
irradiated and spread out over hundreds of miles.

Performing lifesaving measures takes priority over measuring for exposures for those already
exposed. For emergency responders coming from outside the city, limiting their distance to the
hypocenter is a priority. Emergency responders will not sacrifice their life for an individual who
is already in the lethal radiation zone. Doing so would kill both; however, the emergency limits
for personal exposures (ERPGs) would temporarily be suspended, and stay times would be
developed to prevent the further loss of life. Measurements required would include dose rate
exposure from handheld instruments. Aerial surveys would be conducted to establish an initial
cordon. Radiation teams would use this data to create new radiation exposure limits for
emergency responders and the public. Aerial surveys, in addition to pre-dispersal aerial surveys,
would include air sampling due to atmospheric dispersion. A nuclear detonation releases
fissionable material into the atmosphere. Radiation teams will determine a respiratory protection
factor needed to protect against alpha inhalation. A ZnS scintillation counter can be used to
count alpha on an air filter. Radiation teams can use these same detectors to perform
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decontamination sweeps of those exiting cordoned areas. Cordon areas potentially will be in
place for the long-term, and stationary portal monitors may be set up. Downwind crops, water,
livestock will be highly contaminated. Scintillators such as the FIDLER CsI scintillator detector
will be used to determine the extent of ground contamination. CAMs are a long-term solution to
area monitoring. Liquid scintillation detectors are required to test water contamination. Like the
studies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, long-term human studies involving bioassays, personal
dosimetry, and whole-body counting will be performed. The irradiation of the earth by nuclear
detonation will form unknown concentrations of some long-lived radionuclides. Gamma
spectroscopy can be used to determine the mix of radionuclides present. Isotopes likely to be
detected are 90Sr, 131I, and 137Cs. Strontium-90 is a pure beta emitter, but its progeny, 90Y, will
have some accompanying gammas.

In summary, measurements required would include:


Isotopic identification (Radiological Mix) – gamma spectrometry



Large scale monitoring/mapping – air and vehicle born survey systems



Localized exposure rate measurements – Handheld survey instruments



Contamination surveys of equipment/people – Handheld contamination instruments or
portal monitors



Ground deposition – Handheld survey instruments

3.8.2. Nuclear Reactor Incident or Event Involving Significant Release
The second type is a Nuclear Power Plant Accident. Major release from a commercial nuclear
power plant are deviations from the periodic releases of airborne or waterborne radioactivity
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within regulatory limits as part of normal operations. Spent nuclear fuel release is included in
this category. An accident or attack on a power plant could result in the spread of nuclear
material over a populated area. Whether accidental or malevolent, this is the second-worst type
of dispersal scenario. Monitoring would mirror that of a DNE and include aerial, vehicle,
ground, and decontamination surveys. Due to the long-term fallout of a nuclear accident, portal
monitors may be warranted as well. Fissile products from DNEs are expected as well.

In summary, measurements required would include:


Isotopic identification (Radiological Mix) – gamma spectrometry



Large scale monitoring/mapping – air and vehicle born survey systems



Localized exposure rate measurements – Handheld survey instruments



Contamination surveys of equipment/people – Handheld contamination instruments or
portal monitors



Ground deposition – Handheld survey instruments



Air sampling

3.8.3. Beta/Gamma Radiation Dispersal Device or Transportation Accident
The next type is a beta/gamma radiation dispersal device (RDD). An RDD, also known as a
dirty bomb, is a mix of a chemical explosive such as dynamite and radioactive powders or pellets
such as the beta-emitting isotope 90Sr. The detonation of the chemical explosive carries the
radioactive material over an area. The radioactive material does not undergo nuclear fission or
fusion. Unlike a DNE or nuclear accident, there is no nuclear reaction in an RDD. Radiation
responses will also be on a smaller scale. The dispersal mechanism does not have to be
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explosive-based but can be dispersed mechanically or aerosolized. An encounter with this type
of RDD is the most probable because the radioactive material is plentiful and easily obtained;
however, it is also the easiest to detect. Sr-90 makes an effective RDD because of its long halflife, high specific activity, and it is easy to shield until it is time to use. The fallout of a 90Sr
RDD is limited to areas of contamination because of this. Sr-90 can be found in radioisotope
thermoelectric generators (RTGs) and spent fuel rods. RTGs are placed in remote locations with
little or no manned security. Fission products’ detection is not necessary, but instrumentation
needs are the same.

A transportation accident would fall into one of the categories above. Documentation, labels,
and placards identifying radioactive material must accompany radioactive material shipments.
Multiple sources of documentation of the isotope being transported are available onsite and with
the dispatcher. Identifying the nuclide usually is not the concern but instead determining the
extent of the contamination. If a vehicle were transporting multiple sources of different types,
then identifying a located source would be more critical. GM tubes, scintillators, and handheld
probes are enough for most traffic accidents. Accidents involving larger vehicles such as trains,
planes, ships, and vehicles on fire require large-scale monitoring to determine the extent of the
contamination. Handheld detectors must also account for alpha, beta, and neutron sources.
There is a possibility the source may become aerosolized in a transportation accident, much like
an RDD.

In this case, the situation is treated as an RDD of a known isotope. Air sampling is required for
potential exposure to the public, and personal dosimetry is necessary for emergency responders.
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Adherence to ERPGs and other protective action guidelines (PAGs) is expected. Emergency
responders use electronic personal dosimeters (EPDs) to detect beta and gamma exposures and
neutron exposures on specific models. Beta/gamma EPDs utilize either a GM tube, NaI, or CsI
scintillator, and neutron EPDs use a 3H or LiI detector. Passive personal dosimeters can be used
but provide no feedback when an exposure limit has been exceeded. Passive personal dosimeters
such as thermoluminescent devices (TLDs), optically stimulated luminescence dosimeters and
infrared stimulated luminescence (IRSL) dosimeters can be used in tandem with EPDs.

In summary, measurements required would include:


Isotopic identification (Radiological Mix) – gamma spectrometry



Large scale monitoring/mapping – air and vehicle born survey systems



Localized exposure rate measurements – Handheld survey instruments



Contamination surveys of equipment/people – Handheld contamination instruments or
portal monitors



Ground deposition – Handheld survey instruments



Air sampling

3.8.4. Alpha Radiation Dispersal Devise (α-RDD), Broken Arrow, or Failed Improvised
Nuclear Device (IND)
The next type is an alpha radiation dispersal device (α-RDD), Broken Arrow, or Failed
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). An α-RDD contains plutonium. Broken Arrow is the code
name of accidents involving a nuclear weapon outside the context of deterrence. Broken Arrow
may include IND, but for this scenario, RDD is considered. An IND that fails to reach criticality

41

is a failed IND. A failed IND behaves much like an RDD. Alpha emitters such as 239Pu and
241

Am have weakly emitting gamma as well. Gamma detection devices, as in the previous

examples, could also be employed here. The situation would require the same instrumentation as
a beta/gamma RDD, and alpha detectors would also be required. Portable handheld ZnS
scintillation alpha detectors can detect surface contamination. Portable gamma spectroscopy
utilizing HPGe detectors and alpha spectroscopy can identify fissile isotopes.

Unfortunately,

alpha spectroscopy is limited in portability. Ion-implanted silicon charged-particle detectors
require a vacuum to count alpha effectively, increasing the device’s size and weight. Liquid
scintillation for alpha spectroscopy devices are also quite large and requires lab-like precision
when creating aliquots. RIIDs are ineffective due to their inability to detect alpha and low-level
gamma.

In summary, measurements required would include:


Isotopic identification (Radiological Mix – age determination) – gamma spectrometry



Large scale monitoring/mapping – air and vehicle born survey systems



Contamination surveys of equipment/people – Handheld contamination instruments or
portal monitors (alpha)



Ground deposition – Handheld survey instruments, FIDLERs



Air sampling (resuspension)
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3.9. ADM-300 Platform
The ADM-300 Multifunction Survey meter contains a high and low-range gamma GeigerMueller (GM) detector. The small portable case houses the GM, microprocessors, and display.
Various function buttons are located on the top of the unit in Fig 3. The stated range of the GM is
between 60 keV and 3 MeV. It weighs about 1.17 kg and is 4.8 x 11.1 x 21.6 cm 3 in size
(Southern Scientific Ltd., 2021). Opposite the display is an RS-232 serial communications port
and a port to connect to optional external probes to detect alpha, beta, gamma, or neutron
radiation. Two nine-volt batteries provide 100 hours of continuous operation.

Fig. 3: ADM-300 Base Unit
(Southern Scientific Ltd., 2021)

Table 4 scores the specifications for each of the categories of Instrument Limits and
Specifications, Intrinsic Characteristics, Smart Features, and Logistical for the ADM-300.
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Intrinsic
Characteristics

Table 4: ADM-300 Specifications and Scoring
(Southern Scientific Ltd., 2021)
Specification
ADM-300
Detector type
Geiger-Mueller
Alarm
Y
Battery indicator
Y
Battery life
100 hr
Dimensions
4.8 x 11.1 x 21.6 cm3
Humidity
0-95%
Interference: EMF
Pass
Interference: Ionizing
Pass
Ingress Protection
IP44
Mechanical: shock
Pass
Mechanical: vibration
Pass
Power
9V Batteries
Power-on self-test
Y
Pressure
4572 m (15 000 ft)
Readout
LCD
Temperature: range
-30 °C to +50 °C
Temperature: shock
Pass
Units (SI, CGS)
CGS
Weight
1.17 kg (2.6 lb)
Accuracy
Efficiency (4π)
Energy Response
Dose Rate Range
Response Time
Sensitivity
Start-up Time

±15%
1%
80 keV - 3 MeV
0.1 μSv/h - 100 μSv/h
2 to 5s
20 s

44

Utility
1
1
40
8.69
9.5
1
1
4
1
1
9
1
4.57
1
8
1
0
8.55
0.85
0.1
3.6
20.72
0.35
0.05

Smart Features

Connectivity: Bluetooth
Connectivity: Cellular
Connectivity: Print
Connectivity: RF/Other
Connectivity: Satellite
Connectivity: WIFI
Connectivity: Wired
Data Analysis: conversion
Data Analysis: dose-limits
Data Analysis: error
Data Analysis: integrate
Data Analysis: isotope ID
Expert/Advanced Mode
GPS
Graphical User Interface
Internal Clock: date & time
Internal Memory
Removable Flash Memory
Screen: none/black/color

Logistical

Calibration
Consolidation Factor
Consumables Required
Decontamination Method
Durability
Ease of Use
End of Life
Initial Cost
Maintenance Cost
Serviceability
Shelf Life
Tamper Resistance
Training Cost
Training Time
Transportability
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N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Black

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1

1
4
Batteries, Button Source
0
Pass
2
2010
8,192.41
245.7723
0
>5 years
0
$4,000
20 hrs
3

1
4
2
0
1
2
-5.5
2.44
4.07
0
5
0
4
5
3

3.10. Colibri Platform
The Colibri survey meter is a comprehensive health physics instrument with unique
characteristics that is by far the “smartest” survey meter of this analysis. The device is a
handheld G-M detector for measuring gamma, which features a suite of optionally connectable
probes. It features a color screen with built-in analysis software and wireless and GPS
capability. The Colibri platform consists of the Colibri-TTC and Colibri-VLD and a suite of
inter-compatible probes. The probes are compatible with the Multirad-LLR and Radiagem 2000.
Measurements can be converted to SI and non-SI units in real-time and converted to visual
indicators such as graphs. The device can save data for later retrieval and is ruggedized. During
scoring, the Colibri-VLD scored nearly identically to the Colibri-TTC. The Colibri-VLD
contains CsI(Tl) scintillation detector and can detect a lower dose range than the Colibri-TTC.

Fig. 4: Colibri-TTC and Colibri-VLD
(Mirion Technologies, 2015)
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Table 5 scores the specifications for each of the categories of Instrument Limits and

Intrinsic
Characteristics

Instrument Limits and Specifications

Specifications, Intrinsic Characteristics, Smart Features, and Logistical for the Colibri-TTC.

Table 5: Colibri Specifications and Scoring
(Mirion Technologies, 2015)
Specification
Colibri-TTC
Detector type
Geiger-Mueller
Alarm
Y
Battery indicator
Y
Battery life
25 hr
Dimensions
19.5 x 10.0 x 6.9 cm3
Humidity
10-95%
Interference: EMF
Pass
Interference: Ionizing
Pass
Ingress Protection
IP67
Mechanical: shock
Pass
Mechanical: vibration
Pass
Power
Rechargeable Li-ion
Power-on self-test
Y
Pressure
Readout
LCD
Temperature: range
-20 °C to +50 °C
Temperature: shock
Pass
Units (SI, CGS)
SI
Weight
0.63 kg
Accuracy
Efficiency (4π)
Energy Response
Dose Rate Range
Response Time
Sensitivity
Start-up Time

±10%
1%
48 keV to 1.5 MeV
0.05 μSv/h to 10 Sv/h
9.79 Bq
15 s
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Utility
1
1
10
7.43
8.5
1
1
7
1
1
3
1
0
1
7
1
10
15.87
0.9
0.01
3.44
19.11
0.1
0.07

Smart Features

Connectivity: Bluetooth
Connectivity: Cellular
Connectivity: Print
Connectivity: RF/Other
Connectivity: Satellite
Connectivity: WIFI
Connectivity: Wired
Data Analysis: conversion
Data Analysis: dose-limits
Data Analysis: error
Data Analysis: integrate
Data Analysis: isotope ID
Expert/Advanced Mode
GPS
Graphical User Interface
Internal Clock: date & time
Internal Memory
Removable Flash Memory
Screen: none/black/color

Logistical

Calibration
Consolidation Factor
Consumables Required
Decontamination Method
Durability
Ease of Use
End of Life
Initial Cost
Maintenance Cost
Serviceability
Shelf Life
Tamper Resistance
Training Cost
Training Time
Transportability
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Y
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Color

2
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
3
1
1
0
2

1
4
Button Source
1
Pass
5
2034
7,674.00
230.22
0
>5 years
1
$4,000
20 hrs
3

1
4
1
1
1
5
6.5
2.61
4.34
0
5
1
4
5
3

3.11. MULTIRAD-LLR Platform
The MULTIRAD-LLR is a handheld G-M detector for measuring gammas. The Multirad-LLR
is compatible with probes used with the Colibri and Radiagem 2000 platforms, which expand its
capability to detect alpha, beta, and neutron radiation. The device has a simple LCD backlit
screen and displays measurements in SI. The device is rugged and uses conventional disposable
batteries.

Fig. 5: Multirad-LLR
(Mirion Technologies)

Table 6 scores the specifications for each of the categories of Instrument Limits and
Specifications, Intrinsic Characteristics, Smart Features, and Logistical for the MULTIRADLLR.
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Intrinsic
Characteristics

Table 6: MULTIRAD-LLR Specifications and Scoring
(Mirion Technologies)
Specification
MULTIRAD-LLR
Detector type
Geiger-Mueller
Alarm
Y
Battery indicator
Y
Battery life
48 hr.
Dimensions
17.1 x 9.1 x 4.5 cm3
Humidity
1
Interference: EMF
Pass
Interference: Ionizing
Pass
Ingress Protection
IP65
Mechanical: shock
Pass
Mechanical: vibration
Pass
Power
4 AA 1.5 V batteries
Power-on self-test
Y
Pressure
Readout
LCD
Temperature: range
-25°C t +60°C
Temperature: shock
Pass
Units (SI, CGS)
SI
Weight
0.6 kg
Accuracy
Efficiency (4π)
Energy Response
Dose Rate Range
Response Time
Sensitivity
Start-up Time

±10%
1%
50 keV to >3 MeV
0.1 μSv to 10 Sv
0.25 s
-

50

Utility
1
1
19.2
14.28
10
1
1
5
1
1
9
1
0
1
8.5
1
10
16.67
0.8
0.01
4.09
20.72
4
-

Smart Features

Connectivity: Bluetooth
Connectivity: Cellular
Connectivity: Print
Connectivity: RF/Other
Connectivity: Satellite
Connectivity: WIFI
Connectivity: Wired
Data Analysis: conversion
Data Analysis: dose-limits
Data Analysis: error
Data Analysis: integrate
Data Analysis: isotope ID
Expert/Advanced Mode
GPS
Graphical User Interface
Internal Clock: date & time
Internal Memory
Removable Flash Memory
Screen: none/black/color

Logistical

Calibration
Consolidation Factor
Consumables Required
Decontamination Method
Durability
Ease of Use
End of Life
Initial Cost
Maintenance Cost
Serviceability
Shelf Life
Tamper Resistance
Training Cost
Training Time
Transportability
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N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
N
Black

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1

1
4
Batteries, Button Source
1
Pass
2
2022
5,254.00
157.62
0
>5 years
0
$4,000
20 hrs.
3

1
4
2
1
1
2
0.5
3.81
6.34
0
5
0
4
5
3

3.12. Radiagem 2000 Platform
The Radiagem 2000 survey meter contains a G-M detector for detecting gamma. It is compatible
with many of the identical probes as the Colibri and Multirad-LLR platforms, extending its
capability to detect alpha, beta, neutron, and other gamma ranges. The device has a simple LCD
screen with a backlight. Units are displayed in SI with a corresponding bar graph, and
measurements can be saved for later retrieval. The device is ruggedized and lightweight.

Fig. 6: Radiagem 2000
(Mirion Technologies, 2010)

Table 7 scores the specifications for each of the categories of Instrument Limits and
Specifications, Intrinsic Characteristics, Smart Features, and Logistical for the Radiagem 2000.
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Table 7: Radiagem 2000 Specifications and Scoring
(Mirion Technologies, 2010)
Specification
Radiagem 2000
Utility
Detector type
Geiger-Mueller
Geiger-Mueller
Alarm
Y
1
Battery indicator
Y
1
Battery life
80 hr.
32
Dimensions
15 x 8.5 x 4.5 cm3
17.43
Humidity
100%
10
Interference: EMF
Pass
1
Interference: Ionizing
Pass
1
Ingress Protection
IP67
7
Mechanical: shock
Pass
1
Mechanical: vibration
Pass
1
Power
2 AA 1.5 V batteries
9
Power-on self-test
Y
1
Pressure
0
Readout
LCD
1
Temperature: range
–10 °C to +50 °C
6
Temperature: shock
Pass
1
Units (SI, CGS)
SI
10
Weight
0.3 kg
33.33
Accuracy
Efficiency (4π)
Energy Response
Dose Rate Range
Response Time
Sensitivity
Start-up Time

±15%
1%
40 keV to 1.5 MeV
0.01 μSv/h to 100 mSv/h
1 to 10 s
0.83 Bq
-
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0.85
0.01
3.62
5.8
0.2
1.2
-

Smart Features

Connectivity: Bluetooth
Connectivity: Cellular
Connectivity: Print
Connectivity: RF/Other
Connectivity: Satellite
Connectivity: WIFI
Connectivity: Wired
Data Analysis: conversion
Data Analysis: dose-limits
Data Analysis: error
Data Analysis: integrate
Data Analysis: isotope ID
Expert/Advanced Mode
GPS
Graphical User Interface
Internal Clock: date & time
Internal Memory
Removable Flash Memory
Screen: none/black/color

Logistical

Calibration
Consolidation Factor
Consumables Required
Decontamination Method
Durability
Ease of Use
End of Life
Initial Cost
Maintenance Cost
Serviceability
Shelf Life
Tamper Resistance
Training Cost
Training Time
Transportability

N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
Black

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1

1
4
Batteries, Button Source
1
Pass
4
2037
4,580.00
137.4
0
>5 years
1
$4,000
20 hrs.
3

1
4
2
1
1
4
8
4.37
7.28
0
5
1
4
5
3

54

3.13. RDS-100P Platform
The RDS-100P Radiation Detection System is unique in that the base unit does not contain a
radiation detector. The RDS-100P unit is the single-board upgrade of the AN/PDR-77
radiacmeter. The base unit houses the LCD screen, power, and system circuitry to operate a
suite of probes to detect alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron radiation. The RDS-100P was
designed to be rugged, lightweight, flexible, and reliable. It has a serial port for computer
communication.

Fig. 7: RDS-100P
(Mirion Technologies, 2017)

Table 8 scores the specifications for each of the categories of Instrument Limits and
Specifications, Intrinsic Characteristics, Smart Features, and Logistical for the RDS-100P.
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Table 8: RDS-100P Specifications and Scoring
(Mirion Technologies, 2017)
Specification
RDS-100P
Detector type
Base Unit + G-M Probe
Alarm
Y
Battery indicator
Y
Battery life
100 hr
Dimensions
104 x 48 x 192 mm³
Humidity
0-95%
Interference: EMF
Pass
Interference: Ionizing
Pass
Ingress Protection
IP47
Mechanical: shock
Pass
Mechanical: vibration
Pass
Power
9V Batteries
Power-on self-test
Y
Pressure
4500 m (15 000 ft)
Readout
LCD
Temperature: range
-40° C to 50° C
Temperature: shock
Pass
Units (SI, CGS)
SI
Weight
1.11 kg
Accuracy
Efficiency (4π)
Energy Response
Dose Rate Range
Response Time
Sensitivity
Start-up Time

±15%
1%
80 keV to 3 MeV
1 mSv/h to 99 MSv/hr
-
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Utility
1
1
40
10.43
9.5
1
1
7
1
1
9
1
4.5
1
9
1
10
9.01
0.85
0.01
3.62
18.41
-

Smart Features

Connectivity: Bluetooth
Connectivity: Cellular
Connectivity: Print
Connectivity: RF/Other
Connectivity: Satellite
Connectivity: WIFI
Connectivity: Wired
Data Analysis: conversion
Data Analysis: dose-limits
Data Analysis: error
Data Analysis: integrate
Data Analysis: isotope ID
Expert/Advanced Mode
GPS
Graphical User Interface
Internal Clock: date & time
Internal Memory
Removable Flash Memory
Screen: none/black/color

Logistical

Calibration
Consolidation Factor
Consumables Required
Decontamination Method
Durability
Ease of Use
End of Life
Initial Cost
Maintenance Cost
Serviceability
Shelf Life
Tamper Resistance
Training Cost
Training Time
Transportability

N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Black

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

1
4
Batteries, Button Source
1
Pass
3
2038
3,895.00
116.85
1
>5 years
0
$4,000
20 hrs
3

1
4
2
1
1
3
8.5
5.13
8.56
1
5
0
4
5
3
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3.14. Scenario Performance
Each of the detectors above can operate in all the scenarios described above in section 3.8:
Nuclear Emergency, Nuclear Power Accident, an RDD, an α-RDD, Transportation Accident, or
assist in environmental measurements. The detectors’ suite of compatible probes can detect each
radiation type and provide dose rate information. A detector achieving 100% for each
specification with the weighting specified represents the perfect detector. The utilities are
eventually summed, so the effect of each weight on the total was determined. The importance of
each weight can be considered holistically, as in a piechart. Alternatively, the weightings can be
expressed as percentages. Under Instrument Limits and Specifications, most categories were
weighted equally, except for battery life, size, weight, humidity, temperature, and units, which
were assigned most of the importance. These exceptions were weighted more heavily and
approximately equal because they were considered more important in this category. Battery life,
humidity, and temperature speak to the detector’s ability to operate in various environmental
conditions. Size, weight, and units enhance the operator’s ease of use in the field. Accordingly,
the weights were distributed to reflect their relative importance in the above scenarios. For
example, battery life is weighted by a factor of 40, yielding about 25% of the importance for
Nuclear Emergency, Nuclear Power Accident, an RDD, an α-RDD, Transportation Accident, or
assist in environmental measurements under the category of Instrument Limits and
Specifications. Similarly, the same rationale was used for the remaining categories. Under
Intrinsic Characteristics, Dose Rate Range and Energy Response were weighted heavily because
a wide range limits the need for multiple detectors. The other categories were weighted
somewhat conservatively due to their relative importance or lack of consistent published data.
Missing data can adversely affect the final score. For example, Start-up Time is an initial wait

58

time that is no longer experienced once the device is in operation; it is also not a primary driving
consideration for selecting a detector. Under Smart Features, each specification was weighted
equally. Under Logistical Category, Consolidation Factor, Ease of Use, Initial Cost, and
Maintenance Cost were weighted more heavily and approximately equal to each other out of the
remaining specifications. See the appendix for specific weights. Initial Cost can often offset
Maintenance Cost, but in this case, it is a flat rate.
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4. Scoring
The right-most columns of Tables 4 through 8 assigns a utility to the detectors. The utilities
from different requirements are weighted based on their relative importance and summed in the
final row. Weightings can have the same value among different lines, and utilities can have the
same values within a line. The highest-scoring detectors in the sum line are the most favorable.
This section compares the sum of the utilities for each platform. Probes are accounted for in the
comparison. In table 9, the utilities of tables 4 through 8 were summed. The highest scoring
platform is given 100%, and the others are scored relatively.

Table 9: Platform vs. Cumulative Score in Each Category

Instrument Limits and
Specifications
Intrinsic Characteristics
Smart Features
Logistical

ADM-300

Colibri

Radiagem
2000

MULTIR
AD-LLR

RDS-100P

93.4%

78.4%

59.0%

100.0%

87.1%

61.5%
25.0%
53.7%

74.9%
100.0%
84.0%

100.0%
43.8%
97.0%

85.7%
31.3%
74.1%

68.8%
31.3%
100.0%

The weight, small size, and battery life were the strong suits of the Radiagem 2000 and the
weakness of the ADM-300. The platforms performed comparably except for the Radiagem
2000. The dose rate range of the embedded G-M detector has the lowest range of the platforms.
The Colibri platform has many smart features over the other platforms in no small part due to the
embedded software, display, and telemetry. The cost of purchasing and maintaining the RDS100P and Radiagem 2000 are the significant factors separating the platforms. The Colibri
platforms are much easier to use, but the easy-to-use aspect makes them more expensive. The
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following attributes are not differentiating factors among the candidates: Interference (EMF &
Ionizing), Mechanical (Shock & Vibration), Connectivity (Cellular, Print, Satellite, WIFI, &
Wired), Data Analysis (Error, Integrate, & Isotope ID), Removable Flash Memory, Calibration,
Consolidation Factor, Durability, Shelf Life, Training Cost, Training Time, and Transportability.
The inclusion of these utilities does not impact the final results.
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5. Findings
Among the categories of Instrument Limits and Specifications, Intrinsic Characteristics, Smart
Features, and Logistical, the overall ranking is as follows (1 is considered the best):
1. Colibri-TTC
2. Radiagem 2000
3. MULTIRAD-LLR
4. RDS-100P
5. ADM-300
Based on the goals of the organization, the categories of Instrument Limits and Specifications,
Intrinsic Characteristics, Smart Features, and Logistical can be weighted differently to achieve a
different overall ranking. The above is unweighted and gives equal consideration to each
category. If, for example, costs are more important, then the Logistical category can be weighted
more heavily, resulting in the RDS-100P ranking much higher.

Not all information is readily available, and sometimes decisions must be made with incomplete
information. Some data is not available for comparison for every device. This is especially
problematic when summing utilities for comparison. A literature search of comparable values is
a good placeholder value but decreasing the attribute’s weight minimizes this effect. For some
highly weighted categories such as purchase price or dose rate range, the weight is not adjusted
because it would bias the results towards less important attributes.

The final recommendation based on this method is the Colibri platform for use in the scenarios in
section 3.8. The Colibri-TTC should be paired with the appropriate probes for the situation. The
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availability of smart features opens the benefits of increasing user efficiency and, with the
internet, the potential to automate certain aspects of data collection, such as simultaneous realtime remote sensing of multiple detectors.
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6. Analysis/Discussion
Overall, the data suggests the ADM-300 should be replaced due to obsolescence factors. The
other platforms are lighter, smaller, smarter, and cheaper than the ADM-300. The intrinsic
capabilities of the ADM-300 to detect radiation are still competitive and speak to why it has
lasted thus far.

Each specification’s weighting is subjective to a degree, but there is apparent objectivity in this
process also. In sections 3.4 through 3.7, it is clear there is an objective ranking for each
attribute; for example, a lighter product is better than a heavier one. It doesn’t matter what
number is assigned if their respective rankings remain the same, which is reasoning for
normalizing each to one prior to weighting. The more nebulous aspect of the process is
comparing two attributes, for example, weight and size. Is weight more important than size? And
if so, by how much? These types of questions are left open to the user. The user defines the
importance of the attributes with respect to each other. Refer to the Appendix for chosen
weights. Ideally, money would not factor into picking the best detector, but it is often the most
important factor in any decision. The conclusion given is very specific to the scenarios
presented, and assuming different scenarios, perhaps a different detector would be
recommended. Furthermore, the long-term benefit over the life of the device was considered
instead of the short-term. This process assumes rational decision-making. The inclusion of
workplace politics can sometimes tend towards irrational or extreme prioritizing of certain
attributes. To limit sources of error in the process, gather as much data as possible to build
robust matrices and understand organizational priorities to weigh the attributes appropriately.
Consult with supervisors, technical support, superiors, and any published literature to gather all
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necessary information. If some information is missing, then representative data from published
literature on similar products may be used.
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7. Conclusions and Recommendations
Though not designed specifically for the military, the Colibri platform would make a suitable
replacement for the ADM-300. The Colibri performs similarly in detection ability but far
outclasses the other platforms in data analysis and sharing ability. The cost is a significant
drawback of the Colibri platform.
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8. Future Work
Monte Carlo (MC) modeling of the detectors provides more insight into each detector’s
capabilities. MC code provides energy response curves without the need to purchase the
detector. Several MC codes were considered. The most established and widespread MC codes
are Fluktuierende Kaskade (FLUKA), Geometry and Tracking (GEANT4), Monte Carlo NParticle extended (MCNPX/6), and Particle and Heavy Ion Transport Code System (PHITS).
PHITS is preferred for student research for its ease and costs.

The PHITS model of the energy response curve will differ slightly from the measured energy
response curve, but from the model, the behavior of the detector can be predicted. The energy
dependence curve is given for the ADM-300 in Fig. 8.

Fig. 8: Energy Response Curve of the ADM-300
(Armstrong, Hoak, Nixon, & Martin, 1992)
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The PHITS code and parameters were chosen to approximate the behavior of the ADM-300
closely. The modeled energy response of the ADM-300 is approximated in PHITS in Fig. 9.

Fig. 9: PHITS Energy Response Curve for the ADM-300

Further research is recommended in MC simulations. Every combination of detector and probe
can be modeled, and their intrinsic characteristics can be more easily compared at a glance.
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10. Appendix
10.1 Tables

Intrinsic
Characteristics

Instrument Limits and Specifications

Category

Table 10: Weightings Applied to Specifications
Specification
Alarm
Battery indicator
Battery life
Dimensions
Humidity
Interference: EMF
Interference: Ionizing
Ingress Protection
Mechanical: shock
Mechanical: vibration
Power
Power-on self-test
Pressure
Readout
Temperature: range
Temperature: shock
Units (SI, CGS)
Weight
Accuracy
Efficiency (4π)
Energy Response
Energy Resolution
Dose Rate Range
Response Time
Sensitivity
Start-up Time
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Weight
1
1
40
28
10
1
1
8
1
1
9
1
5
1
9
1
10
33
1
0.3
20
0.1
20
4
2
0.1

Smart Features

Connectivity: Bluetooth
Connectivity: Cellular
Connectivity: Print
Connectivity: RF/Other
Connectivity: Satellite
Connectivity: WIFI
Connectivity: Wired
Data Analysis: conversion
Data Analysis: dose-limits
Data Analysis: error
Data Analysis: integrate
Data Analysis: isotope ID
Data Analysis: Expert/Advanced Mode
GPS
Graphical User Interface
Internal Clock: date & time
Internal Memory
Removable Flash Memory
Screen: Black/Color/none

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Logistical

Calibration
Consolidation Factor
Consumables Required
Decontamination Method
Durability
Ease of Use
End of Life
Initial Cost
Maintenance Cost
Serviceability
Shelf Life
Tamper Resistance
Training Cost
Training Time
Transportability

1
4
2
1
1
5
9
5
9
1
5
1
4
5
3
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